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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 18,250
vs.
THOMAS DEAN LAKEY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Information with the crime of Theft
by Deception, a second degree felony, in that on or about the
31st day of January, 1981, in violation of Sections 76-6-405 and
76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the Appellant
obtained or exercised control over the property of Richard Ryan
by deception with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and
that the value of the property exceeded $1,000.00.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, with the Honorable George E.
Ballif, Judge, presiding, on the 29th day of October, 1981.
Following the trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

charged.

Appellant was sentenced on the 22nd day of January,

1982, to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years.

Notice of Appeal

in this matter was filed in the Utah County Clerk's Office, on
February 16, 1982.
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
judgment of guilt entered in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During January of 1981, Appellant was operating a gift and
toy store in Provo, Utah.

At some

t~me

during that month, he had

occasion to view samples of clothing owned by one Richard Ryan
which were being offered for sale to various businesses.
Appellant expressed to Mr. Ryan some interest in purchasing some
of the items to be sold in his gift and toy store.

At

Appellant's request, Mr. Ryan brought some merchandise to
Appellant's store on January 30, 1981.

Mr. Ryan testified that

the price of the merchandise which was delivered was $2,763.18.
Following delivery of the merchandise, a discussion was had between Appellant and Mr. Ryan regarding payment.

Appellant

tendered a personal check to Mr. Ryan for the purchase price of
the merchandise and asked Mr. Ryan to not cash the check that day
but to merely deposit the check into his checking account.
-2-
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Mr. Ryan understood that Appellant intended to make some deposits
and he agreed to not cash the check that day.

Appellant testi-

fied that he was negotiating with four individuals to invest merchandise and capital into his business and that he expected to
deposit enough cash into his account to cover the check by the
time the check reached his bank for payment.
The money expected by the Appellant did not materialize and
the check written to Mr. Ryan was returned unpaid due to insufficient funds in Appellant's account.

There was contradictory

testimony regarding whether or not Appellant offered to return
all or part of the merchandise to Mr. Ryan.

Testimony from both

sides, however, indicated that Appellant offered to pay Mr. Ryan
in installments of 10% per month and that Mr. Ryan refused the
offer on the advice of the police in order to avoid jeopardizing
the case against Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
A. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
show that the property was obtained by deceptionG
Section 76-6-405(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides as follows:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control
over property of another by deception and with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This Section sets forth two basic elements of the crime of
Theft by Deception: (1) Obtaining control of property by deception, and (2) having a purpose to deprive the owner of the property.

The first element of this crime will be dealt with in

this section of Appellant's brief.

The second section will deal

with the element of purpose to deprive.
"Deception" is defined in Section 76-6-401(5), Utah Code
Annoated, 1953, as amended with five separate definitions, only
one of which must be proven.

Those five definitions are as

follows:
(a) Creates or conf ims by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false and that the actor
does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact
that the actor peviously created or confirmed by words or
conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another
and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another fm acquiring information likely
to affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property
without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim,
or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property,
whether the lien, security interest, claim, or impediment
is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official
records; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction, which performance
the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed; provided, however, tha~ failure ~o perform the
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
One of the five alternatives must be shown to exist as of
the time possession is obtained and that possession was obtained
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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as a result of that deception.

In Jury Instruction No. 9, the

Court listed three of those five alternatives as the definition
of "deception"; those being paragraphs (5) (a),

(b) and (e).

Each of the three definitions relates to a false impression
of fact which the defendant either creates or fails to correct at
the time possession is transferred.
The State apparently asserts that Appellant created in impression of fact that the check was good as of the time it was
given to Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan's testimony, however, reveals that

Appellant never represented that the check was then good, but
rather that it would be good in the future.

He testified that

Appellant asked him not to cash the check that day (T. page 15,
Lines 29-30) (all references to the transcript of trial in this
brief will be designated in this manner); that there was no
conversation as to whether or not the check would clear the bank
(T. page 16, lines 10-12); and that he understood Appellant intended to make some deposits and didn't want to mess up his bank
account (T. page 16, lines 16-20).

At no time did the Appellant

represent that the check was good at that time.

The only im-

pression of that which was shown by the State to have been
created by the Appellant was that the check would clear the bank
if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account, because the Appellant had
some deposits he intended to make.
turned out to be false.

That impression of fact later

The check did not later clear the bank.

This portion of the definition of deception was proven by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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State.

The Appellant never contested the fact that the check did

not actually clear the bank.
The portion of the definition of "deception" which Appellant
asserts was not proven revolves around the words "that the actor
does not believe to be true".

Did the Appellant, at the time he

told Mr. Ryan that he intended to make some deposits before the
check reached the bank, not believe that impression of fact to be
true?

Or, did the Appellant actually believe the check would

clear the bank if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account.

Did the

Appellant actually believe he would deposit enough money to cover
the check by the time it reached his bank?
The Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence
produced by the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Appellant knew the check would not clear his bank.

The State's

evidence through bank employee, Rick Anderson, showed that there
were not enough funds in Appellant's account on the date the
check was written, to cover the check.

The State further pro-

duced testimony of Richard Ryan which showed the following:
1.

Appellant asked him to not cash the check, but to de-

posit the check in his bank account (T. page 15, lines 29-30).
2.

Appellant told him that if he wanted cash rather than a

check, that he could come back to the store the following Monday
and bring the merchandise at that time (T. page 20, lines
14-15).
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

He understood that Appellant had some deposits he was

going to make so that his account would not be messed up (T. page
16, lines 16-20).
At the conclusion of the State's case, the jury had before
it testimony that the check was written on January 30, 1981; that
on that date there were not sufficient funds to cover the check;
that Appellant asked Mr. Ryan not to cash the check that day, but
to deposit the check; that Appellant had some deposits he intended to make to cover the check before it reached his bank for payment; and that when the check reached Appellant's bank for
payment, those expected deposits had not been made.
The impression of fact created by Appellant was that
Appellant intended to make some deposits and that the check would
clear the bank if deposited in Mr. Ryan's account and allowed to
run through the normal banking channels.

In the evidence pre-

sented by the State, there was nothing to indicate or allow the
jury to infer that Appellant did not actually believe the
deposits would be made.

There is likewise nothing in the

evidence to indicate or from which the jury could infer that the
Appellant did not actually believe the check would clear his bank
after being deposited in Mr. Ryan's account.
The State presented ample evidence on the nature of the
impression of fact and that the impression of fact later turned
out to be false.

However, the State presented no evidence at all

from which the jury could infer that on January 30, 1981,
-7-
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Appellant did not believe he would make sufficient deposits to
cover the check by the time it reached his bank.
In the case of State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1978),
the Court considered, for the first time, the elements of the
statute under which Appellant was convicted.

In that case, the

Court affirmed the finding of deception where the defendant had
represented that a car's mileage was 33,000 when he knew that
representation to be false.

The Court also likened Section

76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, to its predecessor, the crime of
obtaining property by false pretenses.

Cases considering the

crime of obtaining property by false pretenses have uniformly
required a false representation which the defendant knew to be
false.

The representation made by Appellant in this case was

that he intended to make deposits so that the check would be good

I

by the time it reached the bank and that Mr. Ryan could not get

J

cash for the check on that date.

Those representations were not

false and were not believed by the Defendant to be false.
Appellant actually intended to make deposits and Mr. Ryan could
not cash the check that day.

The Appellant never represented

that the check was good on the date of January 30, 1981, and he
made sure Mr. Ryan knew that he couldn't get cash that day.
We are subjected to false impressions of fact every day of
our lives.

The essential difference between a false impression

of fact and deception is the state of mind of the person creating
the impression of fact.

Anytime a check is written, an impress-

ion Sponsored
of fact
is Quinney
created
the
check
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clear
bank.
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I

not uncommon for checks to be written with the belief that deposits will be made before the check reaches the bank.

It is not

uncommon for those expected deposits to fall through, resulting
in dishonor of checks.

Without some evidence upon which the jury

could find that Appellant knew the check would not clear the bank
when it was presented to the bank for payment, the jury's verdict
of guilt is unsupported by evidence and must be reversed.
Appellant's testimony presented at trial was to the effect
that he had contacted a number of individuals to invest money and
merchandise in his store.

He further testified that he wrote

checks to various individuals during the month of January, 1981,
wih the belief that the money would be there to cover the checks
before the checks reached his bank (T. page 54, lines 19-21).

He

further testified that the money he expected did not arrive, that
some of the potential investors ended up supplying merchandise
around the time that he wrote the check to Mr. Ryan.
The only evidence relating to Appellant's belief was presented by Appellant and was uncontroverted by the State.

The

only evidence before the jury regarding the Appellant's belief
was that Appellant actually believed he would receive enough
money to cover the check before it reached his bank.

The State

presented no evidence to show that Appellant did not believe the
money would be received and presented no evidence to contradict
Appellant's testimony that he actually believed he would receive
enough money to cover the check before it reached his bank.
-9-
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Without some evidence that Appellant knew his representation to
be false, there is no deception as defined by the law.

The only

thing the State showed was poor business judgment, not actual
deception.

Proof of deception required some evidence to show

that Appellant knew the check would not be covered.

The

Appellant made no representation which he knew to be false.

The

State presented no evidence to the contrary and the jury's
verdict is not supported by the evidence.
B. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
show that Appellant had a purpose to deprive the owner of
the property.
The second element of Section 76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, is that the Defendant have a purpose to deprive
the owner of the property.

Appellant contends that the evidence

presented at trial on this issue was insufficient to justify the
jury's verdict.

The Appellant's intentions regarding the

property can only be learned from what the Appellant may have
said or done.
In 50 Am Jur 2d Larceny, Section 36, Page 195, the general
rule is stated that:
..• it is not larceny to take a thing for a temporary
purpose with a bona fide intention of returning it,
or or paying for it or otherwise accounting therefor
to the owner, even though such intention is not
carried out.
The State produced no evidence of the Appellant's intent to
-10-
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deprive the owner of the property.

The State produced no

evidence from which the jury could infer or assume that the
Appellant intended to deprive the owner of the property.
The following uncontroverted evidence was produced at trial
to show what the Appellant did and said:
1.

The Appellant had instructed his clerk to return mer-

chandise to those who wanted it (T. page 44, lines 15-16).
2.

Mr. Ryan went to Appellant's business on Feburary 28,

1981 and saw some of his merchandise (T. page 71, lines 12-17).
3.

One supplier went to Appellant's business on February

28, 1981 and picked up his merchandise (T. page 48, lines 29-30).
4.

Appellant offered to pay Mr. Ryan a certain sum each

month to pay for the goods, but Mr. Ryan would not accept partial
payments due to his conversations with the police regarding
jeopardizing the case against Appellant.
There was a conflict in the testimony regarding whether or
not Appellant had offered Mr. Ryan the return of all or part of
the merchandise.

The evidence is clear that after the check was

dishonored, Mr. Ryan went to Appellant's business and at least
one-third of the merchandise was there at that time.

There is no

evidence that Appellant ever tried to hide the merchandise or
that he did not intend to pay for the merchandise.

Even based

upon the State's evidence, Appellant offered to pay for the goods
at the rate of 10% per month, but Mr. Ryan would not accept
partial payment.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONCLUSION
Looking at the evidence as a whole, this case involves a
merchant who

~ought

merchandise by way of a check, expecting to

deposit enough money to cover the check by the time it got to his
bank.

When his expected deposits fell through, he tried to

return the merchandise and/or pay monthly payments to pay the
supplier for the goods.

There is nothing in the record to show

any intent on the Appellant's part to not pay for the goods.

The

evidence shows he tried to pay for the goods on an installment
basis, but the victim refused.
There is no evidence that Appellant had any intent to
deprive the owner of the property, either at the time of sale or
later.

All evidence shows that he intended to pay for the pro-

perty or to allow the owner to take the merchandise back.

There

is nothing to support the jury's verdict and it must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this /~
i

day of August, 1982.

ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

~~

Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to DAVID L. WILKENSON,
Utah Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111 this /~ day of August, 1982.
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